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HABERMAS AND RAWLS  
ON AN EPISTEMIC STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE 
Abstract 
The so-called debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concentrated mainly on the 
latter’s political liberalism. It dealt with the many aspects of Rawls’s philosophical project. In this 
article, I focus only on one of them, namely the epistemic or cognitivistic nature of principles of 
justice. The first part provides an overview of the debate, while the second part aims to show that 
Habermas has not misinterpreted Rawls’s position. I argue that Habermas rightly considers 
Rawls’s conception of justice as a moral one. In the last part, I discuss two key questions raised by 
Habermas. The first concerns the relation between justification and acceptance of the principles of 
justice. The second concerns the relation between two validity terms: truth and reasonableness. 
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE
The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls began in 1995 on the 
pages of The Journal of Philosophy following the publication of their two main 
works of political philosophy: Habermas’s Faktizität und Geltung in 1992 
(translated into English in 1996 as Between Facts and Norms1) and Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism in 1993. Habermas initiated the exchange with his 
“Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism.” 2  Rawls replied to Habermas with the text “Political 
1 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 3 (March 1995): 109–131. 
Krzysztof Kędziora 32 
Liberalism: Reply to Habermas.”3  These two articles were supplemented by 
Habermas’s reaction to Rawls’s response which appeared in 1996 as a chapter in 
the collection of essays Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen 
Theorie (translated as The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory4 in 
1998) entitled “‘Reasonable’ versus ‘True’, or the Morality of Worldviews.”5 
Reconciliation is mainly a “constructive and immanent” 6 critique of Rawls’s 
philosophical project of Political Liberalism, which Habermas still considers to 
be an instance of a thorough and critical re-evaluation of Kant’s practical 
philosophy. This means that his critique remains “within the bounds of a familial 
dispute.”7 It consists of three parts. In the first part Habermas questions whether 
the design of the original position is appropriately constructed to fully express 
impartial and deontological qualities of principles of justice. In the second part 
he asks how to understand the requirement that a conception of justice gain 
acceptance of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Habermas suggests that 
Rawls does not clearly distinguish between questions of acceptance and 
questions of justification. As a consequence of this, Rawls seems to waive a 
claim to cognitive validity of principles of justice. In the last part Habermas 
argues that Rawls’s philosophical decisions, mentioned above, result in giving 
priority to liberal rights over democratic self-determination: “Rawls thereby fails 
to achieve his goal of bringing the liberties of the moderns into harmony with 
the liberties of the ancients.”8 
3 John Rawls, “Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 3 
(March 1995): 132–180.  
4 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, trans. Ciaran Cronin 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998). 
5  For the context of the debate see: James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen, 
“Introduction: The Habermas-Rawls Dispute – Analysis and Reevaluation,” in Habermas and 
Rawls: Disputing the Political, ed. James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 1–21. The introduction also provides an overview of the earlier stages of the 
debate. It was Habermas who was more engaged in commenting on and polemicizing with John 
Rawls’s philosophy than vice versa. His main focus was naturally on A Theory of Justice and the 
conception of justice as fairness, which he considered as an attempt, similar to his own, to 
reformulate Kant’s practical philosophy. See also James Gordon Finlayson, The Habermas-Rawls 
Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), where he elaborates on the aforementioned 
introduction.  
6 Habermas, “Reconciliation,” 110.  
7 Ibid. Habermas remarked later that “Reconciliation” had been meant as a review of Political 
Liberalism and he had failed to fully appreciate its significance at that time. He acquired a proper 
grasp of Rawls’s work “only gradually” and then was able to adequately understand his insistence 
on the reasonable pluralism. Jürgen Habermas, “Reply to My Critics,” in Habermas and Rawls: 
Disputing the Political, ed. James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 283–284. 
8 Ibid. 
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As the title of his article indicates, Rawls focuses largely on responding to 
Habermas’s critique without engaging in polemics about Habermas’s 
philosophy. Rawls makes only two remarks on differences between his own 
conception of justice and Habermas’s theory. The first concerns the different 
standing of their positions. Habermas’s theory, claims Rawls, is a “comprehen-
sive doctrine” whereas his own is political.9 The second remark concerns the 
differences between the “devices of representation” they use to conceptualize 
the moral point of view.10 The first remarks may explain why Rawls avoids any 
polemical engagement with Habermas’s philosophy. According to him, there is 
no real rivalry between their positions because they operate at different levels: 
justice as fairness at a political level; the theory of communicative action, 
discourse ethics, and so on at a philosophical level. 
The subject of the last Habermas article, which marked the end of the debate 
on account of Rawls’s death in 2002, is the relation between “reasonableness” 
and “truth”, and the role they play in justification of principles of justice. 
Paradoxically, the philosophical questions Rawls tried to avoid in order to 
secure an agreement on his principles of justice shows how important and 
inescapable they really are.11 The more we try to suppress them, the more they 
impose themselves on us. Given that, in my view, the questions of justification 
of principles of justice and their validity go right to the heart of Rawls’s project, 
I will focus on the peculiarity of his approach to these issues.  
2. DID THEY TALK PAST ONE ANOTHER?
Before proceeding, I will address one of the most frequently raised objections, 
namely that the debate between Habermas and Rawls was misplaced because 
they were not seeking to establish a common ground and instead worked on the 
9 Rawls, “Reply,” 132. I will not go into detail here. I simply point to Rawls’s account of the 
comprehensive character of Habermas’s philosophy because it is crucial for his own philosophical 
self-understanding. Rawls contrasts his own conception of justice which is limited to the domain 
of the political and does not enter into philosophical controversies with Habermas’s theory whose 
aims are more ambitious. He wants, Rawls writes, “to give a general account of meaning, 
reference, and truth or validity both for theoretical reason and for the several forms of practical 
reason,” Ibid., 135. There is no easy answer to the question of whether Habermas’s philosophy is 
comprehensive in Rawls’s sense and Rawls’s is not. Yet, it is important to note that Rawls defines 
the comprehensiveness of a doctrine by its engagement in philosophical controversies. His own 
position is supposed to be free of them. I will return to this later. See: Joseph Heat, “Justice. 
Transcendental not Metaphysical,” in Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political, ed. James 
Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen (New York: Routledge, 2011), 117–134. 
10 Rawls, “Reply,” 138–142.  
11 The crude summary I have given is meant to give only a hint of the complexities of the debate 
between Habermas and Rawls. Even if, as I mentioned, the death of Rawls ended the exchange 
between them, it is far from having concluded.  
Krzysztof Kędziora 34 
assumptions of their own conceptions. There is some validity to this objection. 
Indeed, both Habermas and Rawls start from the assumptions of their own 
conceptions and try to evaluate the position of the other in light of those 
conceptions. Of course, this does not mean that they were not truly engaged 
in the debate and only seized the opportunity to expose their ideas. This reliance 
on the resources of their own theories seems not only natural but also to have 
a decisive advantage. It enables them to examine the same problems that both of 
their theories address from different points of view and to express them through 
different philosophical vocabularies.12 
The more serious objection is that they misinterpret the other’s position 
because their conceptions have a different “subject matter,” or “object 
domain.”13 Finlayson claims this misinterpretation goes back to so-called “early 
debate.”14 Habermas regards Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness as a “gen-
eral moral theory,” that is, a theory of right conduct (“justice-qua-morality,” as 
Finlayson calls it). As a consequence of this, he “depoliticizes and moralizes 
Rawls’s theory of justice.”15 However, Rawls’s justice as fairness has been, from 
the beginning, a political conception of justice (“political-cum-legal justice,” in 
Finlayson’s terms). Unlike morality, the subject of justice is not all relations 
between individuals, but rather the basic structure of a society, namely 
a society’s main political and economic institutions.16 In other words, the princi-
ples of justice do not regulate all relations between individuals, but only a subset 
of them. And they do so indirectly by regulating the institutions which in turn 
regulate the conduct of individuals. These institutions can legally enforce the 
conformity to their rules so the principles of justice are ipso facto political.17 So, 
concludes Finlayson, there is no point of comparison between Habermas’s 
discourse ethics and Rawls’s justice as fairness because when they use the term 
“justice,” they have two significantly different things in mind.  
After Political Liberalism and in his own Between Facts and Norms and 
articles, Habermas continues to view Rawls’s justice as fairness as a Kantian 
12 Finlayson, The Habermas-Rawls Debate, 8–9.  
13 Ibid., 49–50. See also: James Gledhill, “Procedure in Substance and Substance in Procedure. 
Reframing the Rawls-Habermas Debate,” in Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political, ed. 
James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen (New York: Routledge, 2011), 181–182; 
Christopher McMahon, “Habermas, Rawls and Moral Impartiality,” in Habermas and Rawls, 201. 
14  He means by “the early debate” Habermas’s writings about discourse ethics: Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1990); Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. 
Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993). Discourse ethics was developed by 
Habermas and appeared in German in the 1980s. I focus only on the alleged “misinterpretation” on 
the part of Habermas. 
15 Finlayson, The Habermas-Rawls Debate, 50. 
16 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1971), 7–9. 
17 See Finlayson, The Habermas-Rawls Debate, 74. 
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moral conception. It goes without saying that the resources of his discourse 
theory of law and democracy allow him to state the objections to justice as 
fairness differently than the resources of the discourse ethics did, or, in other 
words, they allow him to make objections from two angles: discourse ethics and 
the discourse theory of law and democracy, respectively. So, for example, in 
terms of discourse ethics, Habermas may claim that Rawls does not correctly 
conceptualize the moral point of view, while in terms of the discourse theory of 
law and democracy, he may claim that the conception of justice as fairness 
neglects the institutional framework of justice. I think Habermas is right here, 
since there is an ambiguity in Rawls’s notion of justice. Rawls’s conception of 
justice, notwithstanding his claims, seems to be more similar in some crucial 
respects to a moral conception than a political conception in the Habermasian 
sense, although it aspires to incorporate some functions of law into itself. 
To evaluate Habermas’s equation between justice and morality, one needs to 
first look at his distinction between morality and law, and then to see how the 
notion of justice works in the conception of justice as fairness. Though 
the distinction between morality and law cannot be easily mapped onto the 
distinction between “justice-qua-morality” and “political-cum-legal justice,” we 
could try to trace similarities and differences in order to answer the question of 
whether Rawls’s conception of justice is either a moral or a truly political 
conception. 
According to Habermas, both moral and legal norms are “action norms,” that 
is to say, they regulate interpersonal relations and adjudicate between conflicting 
claims. It is not, therefore, the role they play which differentiates moral from 
legal norms, but rather the way of achieving this goal. Morality is “only 
a symbolic system,” or “a form of cultural knowledge” which means that 
morality has a weak motivational force, whereas law is not only a symbolic 
system but “an action system as well.”18  Law, thanks to its formal aspects, 
overcomes this motivational deficit. Habermas uses Kant’s distinction between 
“will” (Wille) and “free choice” (Willkür),19 “action” (Handlung) and “incen-
tive” (Triebfeder), “duty” (Plicht) and “inclination” (Neigung) in order to point 
to three formal differences between law and morality.20 1) Law, unlike morality, 
has to do not with a will but with free choice. Morality deals with a proper way 
of our self-determination, which, for example, is based on recognition of the 
universality of binding (moral) law, rather than simply with choices we make. It 
18 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 107.  
19 The distinction between will and free choice can be understood as the distinction between our 
legislative faculty, or our ability to give ourselves (moral) laws, and our executive faculty, or 
capacity for choice. See: Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 236–254. 
20 Cf. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 45–47 (Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, 218–221). 
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is enough, from the legal point of view, that one chooses to obey legal norms. 
2) Law regulates “external relations of one person to another,” 21  whereas
morality deals mainly with our inner, normatively determined attitudes toward 
others, and deals only indirectly with external actions toward others. 3) From the 
perspective of law, it is not necessary that our conformity to legal norms has 
a specific kind of motivation, for example, our sense of duty. Acting in accord-
ance with the law is enough.22  
Yet, Habermas differs from Kant in one crucial respect. He does not 
conceive of the relation between morality and law in a hierarchical manner. This 
means, for Habermas, that law is not morality expressed in legal forms. Legal 
norms are action norms which are, from the outset, constituted through the form 
of law. They are not moral norms which are first established independently from 
their legal shape and then subsequently implemented in a constitution and 
enforced via legal coercion. Certainly, legal norms should not, or even must not, 
contradict moral norms, but this compatibility is not tantamount to the derivation 
of law from morality.23 Morality and law are independent of each other in terms 
of their “origins.” We may explain their mutual independence by the different 
ways of justification of moral and legal norms.  
As we know, the general condition of the validity of action norms is 
expressed by the discourse principle (D): 
Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses.24 
This principle is so specified that we get two other principles. The first of them 
is the principle of universalization (U): 
A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its 
general observance for the interest and value-orientations of each individual 
could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.25 
This principle expresses universality and impartiality which moral norms 
presuppose. In other words, when we combine the principle (D) with the 
requirements of universality and impartiality, we get the moral principle (U). On 
the other hand, when we combine the principle (D) with the “form of law,” 
i.e. formal aspects of legal norms, we get the democratic principle: 
[…] only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all 
citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally 
constituted.26 
21 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 105. 
22 Ibid., 105–106, 112. 
23 Ibid., 105–106.  
24 Ibid., 107. 
25 Habermas, The Inclusion, 42. 
26 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 110. 
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Further elaboration is needed to explain the overall structures of morality and 
law, but this suffices, I think, to see how these two normative systems differ 
from one another. We may turn now to Rawls’s notion of justice and see 
whether it is similar to “political-cum-legal justice” or “justice-qua-morality.”  
In A Theory of Justice Rawls regarded the principles of justice as a subset of 
principles of right. The concept of right with two other concepts of value and 
moral worth make up the whole of practical reasoning, or, we could say, 
practical conduct. It does not mean that the principles of justice are derived from 
the principles of right. Strictly speaking, there are no distinct principles of right 
which would be analogous to moral principles in Habermas’s sense and could be 
distinguished from principles of (political) justice. “Right” is a general term that 
covers different kinds of principles. These principles are differentiated according 
to their domain of application. Some of them are applicable to political and 
economic institutions at the domestic level (the principles of justice) and at the 
international level (the law of nations, or the law of peoples), while others are 
applicable directly to individuals.27 I think the “politicization” of the principles 
of justice in Political Liberalism has not changed anything here. The specificity 
of the principles of justice both in A Theory of Justice and in Political 
Liberalism is a result of their subject, i.e. a society’s basic structure, not of their 
“political-cum-legal” aspect.  
If we look at the role of the principles of justice, we will not be able to show 
their specificity in this way. The role of the principles of justice is to assign 
“rights and duties in the basic institutions of society” and to “define the 
appropriate distributions of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”28 In 
other words, the task of justice is to regulate interpersonal relationships by 
assigning rights and duties and to adjudicate between conflicting claims by de-
signing a just scheme of distribution of social goods. The principles of justice, 
then, are simply general action norms in Habermas’s sense. 
However, the question remains as to whether the principles of justice are 
similar to moral norms or legal norms. I think the answer lies in how Rawls 
conceives of the relation between the principles of justice and legal norms. The 
principles of justice must be translated into positive law. Rawls envisages in 
A Theory of Justice the four-stage sequence of implementation of the principles 
of justice into legal institutions. This hierarchy of norms, from the principles of 
justice through a constitution to particular statues, presupposes the relation 
between morality and law that Habermas criticized. The derivation of legitimate 
law from the principles of justice does not mean that they are the same or the 
same kind. On the contrary, the principles of justice must differ from the legal 
norms in which they are embodied. Whereas the justification of the principles of 
27 Rawls, A Theory, 108–111. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
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justice is based mainly on reasonable and rational considerations behind the veil 
of ignorance, the translation of justice into law requires us to take into account 
not only reasonable and rational considerations but also other kinds of reason 
like ethical (based on some non-political values recognized in a society), 
pragmatic, and so on. We could say that the justification of principles of justice 
requires a different kind of discourse than the implementation of them into law.  
Furthermore, it is redundant to attribute the predicate “just” to the principles 
of justice whereas it is appropriate to ask whether laws are just or at least are not 
unjust. However, while the question of justice of laws is one thing, their 
legitimacy is another. Laws may be unjust (at least to some extent) and 
legitimate at the same time. As such, the question of justice of law is different 
from, albeit related to, the question of the legitimacy of law. 
One of the formulations of the principle of legitimacy holds that: 
[…] political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with 
a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as 
reasonable and rational, can endorse in light of their common human reason.29 
Political power is exercised through law so the question of legitimacy of 
political power is thus the question of legitimacy of law. A constitution, or its 
principal elements, is justified on the grounds of the principles of justice. Then 
laws, which are enacted in accordance with the rules of a just constitution, are 
legitimate. It is worth noting that a just constitution confers legitimacy on laws. 
To be sure, laws may be just as well, but their justice results from the fact that 
they do not contradict the principles of justice, or, in other words, they may 
inherit their “justice” from the principles of justice indirectly.  
Though the aforementioned formulation of the principle of legitimacy does 
not contain the requirement of discursive process of formation of law in which 
all citizens partake, Rawls adds the condition of the justifiability of law (through 
the use of public reason) which this requirement may entail: 
Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them as 
government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other 
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.30 
The idea of public reason specifies what kinds of reasons are appropriate when 
we discuss “constitutional essentials” and “matters of basic justice.”31  These 
reasons are “expressed in public reasoning by a family of reasonable 
conceptions of political justice reasonably thought to satisfy the criterion of 
29 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2001), 
41. 
30 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 446. 
31 Ibid., 442. 
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reciprocity.”32 So the reasons which are appropriate in this discourse are, for the 
most part, determined by reasonable political conceptions of justice. The other 
kinds of reasons may be appropriate for other justifying discourses. Anyway, 
this shows that Rawls’s principle of legitimacy is analogous to Habermas’s 
democratic principle whereas Rawls’s way of justifying the principles of justice, 
via the original position, resembles Habermas’s principle of universalization. 
Thus, Rawls’s principles of justice are a kind of moral principles. Habermas’s 
objection – namely that Rawls moralizes justice – seems to be well-founded. As 
Habermas would say, the principles of justice lack the form of law to count 
as principles of political justice. 
To sum up, I have argued that Rawls’s conception of justice is not political, 
at least in Habermas’s sense, but rather moral. The subject of justice, which is 
the basic structure of society, does not settle the question. Political justice, as we 
could say by analogy with law, is differentiated by its legal form. And this does 
not mean the necessity of implementation of justice into law but the concep-
tualization of justice through the form of law from the outset. In other words, we 
could say that Rawls’s conception of justice is political in the wrong way. 
3. AN EPISTEMIC ASPECT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
Habermas regards Rawls’s conception of justice as Kantian moral doctrine. If it 
is so, as I have tried to show, then the principles of justice must share with moral 
norms “deontological, cognitivistic, formalist, and universalistic qualities.”33 In 
his debate with Rawls, Habermas discusses all of these qualities. He argues that 
Rawls does not fully articulate the meaning of these qualities. I will focus on one 
of them, namely a cognitivistic aspect of principles of justice. This deals with 
two questions posed by Habermas: 
32 Ibid. The criterion of reciprocity is directly connected with the principle of legitimacy and the 
idea of public reason. It holds that when citizens view “one another as free and equal in a system 
of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of 
cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice” 
(Ibid., 446). I will not pursue this in depth here, but I want only to suggest that reciprocity is a part 
of the idea of reasonableness and that reasonableness itself determines our proper attitude to 
others. We should treat others in a way that we can justify to them. As we have seen, morality 
deals with one’s attitudes toward others. Compare what Rawls says about the moral duty of 
civility: Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217; Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 444–
445. 
33 Rainer Forst, “Discourse Ethics,” in The Habermas Handbook, ed. Hauke Brunkhorst et al. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 538; Habermas, Moral Consciousness, 196.  
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I shall examine whether the overlapping consensus, on which the theory of 
justice depends, plays a cognitive or merely instrumental role: whether 
it primarily contributes to the further justification of the theory or whether it 
serves, in light of the prior justification of the theory, to explicate a necessary 
condition of social stability (1). Connected with this is the question of the sense 
in which Rawls uses the predicate “reasonable”: as a predicate for the validity of 
moral judgments or for the reflective attitude of enlightened tolerance (2).34 
In order to understand the gist of Habermas’s argument, we need to provide 
a general overview of Rawls’s “political turn.”35 Rawls faced the problem of a plu-
ralism of irreconcilable doctrines (“comprehensive doctrines”) which are affirmed 
by citizens in a democratic and liberal society. Some of these comprehensive 
doctrines are entirely reasonable, i.e. their pluralism is “the inevitable long-run 
result of the powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring 
free institutions.” 36  In other words, citizens disagree over many matters of 
fundamental importance and this disagreement is fully compatible with human 
reason. The conception of justice, then, cannot be grounded on something so 
controversial. An analogy with the Reformation may be helpful here. When 
people shared the same religion, a political order could be based on it. When the 
unity of religion disintegrated into particular confessions, the common ground of 
a political order disappeared. Then the idea of religious tolerance began to form 
gradually. This was, without doubt, a painful process but its upshot was the 
acceptance of religious diversity, i.e. recognition of other confessions as 
reasonable. The other side of religious tolerance was a conviction that political 
community could not be organized around one religion. The foundation of unity 
had to be sought elsewhere. Religion began to be perceived as lying outside the 
domain of the political, though not necessarily in the private sphere. 
Rawls generalizes the idea of religious tolerance. It is not only religion that 
divides us nowadays, but also other kinds of beliefs, for example concerning 
moral ideals, the good life, and philosophical problems. We should apply the 
idea of tolerance to those beliefs and recognize them as reasonable but, at the 
same time, exclude them from the domain of the political. They are no longer 
suitable for the organization of the political community. Once again, we need to 
look elsewhere for the common ground. Rawls locates it in some political ideas 
like the idea of a society as a fair system of cooperation or the idea of the person 
(or citizen) as free and equal with two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of 
justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. Rawls thinks it is possible 
34 Habermas, “Reconciliation,” 119. 
35 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) gives an excellent account of Rawls’s “political turn.” 
36 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4. 
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to build the conception of justice solely out of these ideas.37 This is the meaning 
of the term “freestanding.” In short, it means that the conception of justice is 
justified only in terms of political ideas in conjunction with principles of 
practical reason. Furthermore, “it is neither presented as, nor as derived from,”38 
any comprehensive doctrines. It must be shown, however, in the next step that 
the conception of justice may gain acceptance of such comprehensive doctrines, 
i.e. it must become a subject of an overlapping consensus of comprehensive 
doctrines. This raises a question as to whether this acceptance is a requirement 
of social stability or adds something to the justification of the principles of 
justice.  
In his Reply Rawls attempts to dispel these doubts. He introduces the three 
kinds of justification:  
[…] first, pro tanto justification of the political conception; second, full 
justification of that conception by an individual person in society; and, finally, 
public justification of the political conception by political society.39 
In introducing these three kinds of justification, the aim is to show how the 
question of justification and the question of social stability are interconnected. 
The pro tanto justification corresponds to the freestanding justification of the 
conception of justice in terms of political ideas. Whereas the conception of 
justice is pro tanto justified from inside the domain of the political, the full 
justification is “carried out by an individual citizen as a member of civil 
society,”40 i.e. from the perspective of a particular comprehensive doctrine.41 To 
carry out the public justification, we need to return to the point of view of the po-
litical conception of justice. The justifying reason here is the fact that all citizens 
have carried out the full justification. In other words, the fact that the 
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines obtains is an 
argument in favor of the political conception of justice. 
There is no justification of the principles of justice without the fact of the 
overlapping consensus as this fact is a decisive reason for them. The acceptance 
37 The epistemic status of these ideas is controversial. Rawls claims that these ideas are “implicit 
in the public culture of a democratic society” (Ibid., 15), which invites the contextualist 
interpretation of Rawls’s political turn à la Rorty. See: Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy 
to Philosophy,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 175–196. I will leave this aside, though I agree with 
Habermas that Rawls does something more than simply articulate shared cultural beliefs. See: 
Habermas, “Reconciliation,” 119–120. 
38 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 12. 
39  Rawls, “Reply,” 142. I use interchangeably the terms “the justification of the (political) 
conception of justice” and “the justification of the principles of justice.”  
40 Ibid., 143. 
41 It is not clear how the shift between these two points of view occurs. It seems that we do not 
have access to a comprehensive doctrine other than from the outside. If so, then we do not have 
the possibility to ascertain whether the justification really has taken place or whether it has failed.  
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of the political conception by reasonable comprehensive doctrines, however, is 
not the same thing as its justification.42 The first and third kinds of justification, 
I think, can be easily explained within the political conception of justice. The 
novelty of the second kind of justification causes some complications, which 
Habermas identifies as “a peculiar dependence of the ‘reasonable’ on the 
‘true’”43: 
Practical reason is robbed of its moral core and is deflated to a reasonableness 
that becomes dependent on moral truths justified otherwise. The moral validity 
of conceptions of justice is now no longer grounded in a universally binding 
practical reason but in the lucky convergence of reasonable worldviews whose 
moral components overlap to a sufficient degree.44 
To unpack Habermas’s criticism, we need first to look at Rawls’s method of 
avoidance. This will help us to understand the shifting of the burden of justifica-
tion from political conceptions of justice to comprehensive doctrines. The 
method of avoidance is a crucial element of Rawls’s political liberalism. 
Adopting this method means that “we try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor 
to deny any religious, philosophical, or moral views, or their associated 
philosophical accounts of truth and the status of values.”45 It does not mean that 
the conception of justice does not presuppose philosophy at all. Rawls admits 
that some philosophy “is implied by the political itself”46 but its assumptions are 
so uncontroversial and weak that it “leaves philosophy as it is.”47 In other words, 
Rawls wants to secure acceptance of his conception of justice, so he needs to 
remove the sources of disagreement and not to engage in philosophical disputes. 
He then lays out the conception of justice as freestanding, which implies, as 
I have just said, some kind of epistemology and metaphysics, but also avoids 
long-standing philosophical controversies. However, Rawls would not agree 
with Rorty who claims we would fare much better without philosophy. 
Philosophy is necessary48 but at the same time it is the source of disagreement. 
The truly demanding tasks of philosophy, like showing the truth of the 
42 See Anthony Simon Laden, “The Justice of Justification,” in Habermas and Rawls: Disputing 
the Political, ed. James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen (New York: Routledge, 2011), 
142–152. There he tries to show how Rawls combines a political justification with a philosophical 
one. In other words, he argues that Rawls perceives justification in practical terms, i.e. its aim is 
not only to show the validity of the principles of justice, but also to provide a basis for an 
agreement between citizens.  
43 Habermas, The Inclusion, 77. 
44 Ibid., 82–83. 
45  John Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 434. 
46 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 10. See Finlayson, The Habermas-Rawls Debate, 125. 
47 Rawls, “Reply,” 134. 
48 It is necessary because it responds to our need of justification of our actions, decisions and so on 
to others. See note 32.  
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conception of justice, are shifted to comprehensive doctrines. It seems to me, 
then, that the term “method of relegation” would better describe what Rawls 
really does than his own preferred term, namely “method of avoidance”. This 
also explains the meaning of the phrase “pro tanto justification.” It is a kind of 
incomplete justification which needs further elaboration, namely the full 
justification, which can be carried out from within comprehensive doctrines. 
The nature of the full justification may be clarified by referring to the dis-
tinction between two kinds of validity terms: reasonableness and truth. The 
former refers mainly to the political conception of justice, while the latter is 
restricted to comprehensive doctrines. The political conception of justice is rea-
sonable if it is pro tanto justified, i.e. it is the result of properly used procedure 
of construction (it would be chosen in the original position), and it is in political 
reflective equilibrium. It is worth noting that this kind of justification is public in 
the sense that Habermas has in mind. It is based on reasons which are shared by 
all reasonable and rational persons.49 Comprehensive doctrines may (not) use the 
term “true” to predicate validity of normative statements. It is up to a particular 
comprehensive doctrine how to define “truth” in every case. Truth is thus not 
public in Habermas’s sense and reasons we regard as true, and what we believe 
to be true, may not be the same for every reasonable and rational person. 
The terms “reasonable” and “true” are complementary in the sense that the 
conception of justice, which is reasonable, may be also true. The question is 
whether we need two validity terms and whether we are able to properly 
conceptualize the differences between them. For Rawls, it seems, the term “true” 
is stronger than term “reasonable” as we need the second kind of justification in 
order to go through the whole process of justification. This, however, turns the 
idea of justification upside down. Justification should be based on reasons which 
are public in Habermas’s sense. If we agree on the content of some propositions, 
but we do so for different reasons, we cannot be certain that our agreement is not 
superficial and that justification is not illusionary. The principles of justice may 
change their meaning within different contexts provided by comprehensive 
doctrines. If we take the principles of justice out of one context and put them 
into a different one, we may slightly (or radically) change their meaning. Think 
of, for example, the two principles of justice of Rawls’s conception of justice 
fully justified and endorsed by a Millian liberal comprehensive doctrine on the 
one hand, and by Catholic doctrine on the other. If it comes to an application of 
the principles of justice to solving some problems, for example an abortion, it 
49 The term “reasonable” is so ambiguous and applied to so many subjects (a person/citizen, 
a society, a doctrine, principles of justice, constraints on choosing principles of justice in the 
original positions, pluralism, and so on) that its different meanings appear to lead to a vicious 
circle. See James W. Boettcher, “What is Reasonableness?,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 30, 
no. 5–6 (2004): 597–621. 
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may turn out that we are not able to reach any agreement on proposed solutions 
because our interpretations of the principles of justice differ so much.50  
In order to overcome this difficulty, one may need to work out and justify the 
conception of justice in terms of public, accessible to all person reasons, and not 
in a monological but in a dialogical way.51 This conforms to the requirements of 
moral discourse in which we try to settle the questions of justice. These 
requirements may be satisfied by pro tanto or freestanding justification with the 
original position, the veil of ignorance, and so on, if that kind of justification 
were sufficiently enriched or reinterpreted. This, however, raises a question: 
why do we need the full justification at all? From the point of view of Rawls’s 
political liberalism, the answer seems to be obvious. We need the second kind of 
justification in order to ensure that the overlapping consensus obtains. But this 
presupposes that comprehensive doctrines, if they are reasonable, must remain 
intact. The political conception of justice must not intervene with reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and must leave them as they are. As I have argued, this 
turns the idea of justification upside down. 
We may turn to the last question posed by Habermas: what is “the sense in 
which Rawls uses the predicate ‘reasonable’: as a predicate for the validity of 
moral judgments or for the reflective attitude of enlightened tolerance”?52 The 
short answer is: both. I leave aside the second alternative, which is explained by 
reasonableness understood as a part of the moral nature of persons, and focus 
only the validity meaning of the term of “reasonable.” As I have said, Rawls 
uses two validity terms: “reasonable” and “true”. Even if it can be said that 
Rawls understands the validity of moral judgments in terms of their 
justifiability, he appears to accept many ways of justification, for example moral 
realist, intuitionist, Kantian constructivism. These different kinds of justification 
aim at truth whereas his own political constructivism, namely freestanding 
justification, aims at reasonableness. The kinds of justification, which aim at 
truth, are incommensurable. By contrast, the freestanding justification may be 
reconciled with them. From this Rawls seems to draw a conclusion that 
“reasonable” and “true” operate at different levels.  
50 Rawls might claim that these differences in the interpretation of the principles of justice can be 
accommodated into the reasonable and explained by the burdens of judgment. He admits that there 
is more than one political conception of justice. There is “a family of political conceptions of 
justice” (Political Liberalism, xlvi–xlvii, 450). I think the source of the pluralism of these political 
conceptions of justice lies in a different way of organizing fundamental ideas at the level of a 
political construction of principles (Ibid.). I have something different in mind, namely the 
differences in the interpretation of the principles of justice already identified at the level of the 
construction. These differences arise from within comprehensive doctrines.  
51 Habermas, The Inclusion, 86–94. 
52 Habermas, “Reconciliation,” 119. 
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As we have seen, Habermas unambiguously identifies the validity of moral 
judgments with their justifiability. Unlike Rawls, however, he does not accept 
substantially differentiated ways of justification,53 but only lays down the formal 
condition that if a moral judgment is to be valid, it must be justifiable. The 
process of justification must be actually carried out in an adequate discourse. In 
the case of principles of justice, it is a discourse governed by the principle (U). 
There is no place for different discourses for the same subject matter, i.e. the 
principles of justice. Therefore, in Habermas’s view, the distinction between two 
validity terms, both of which pertain to principles of justice, seems to be 
incomprehensible because there is no need to introduce two different kinds of 
validity terms for the same kind of judgments. 
4. CONCLUSION
Remarking on the debate between Habermas and Rawls, Joseph Heat complains 
that much of it became “sidetracked,” lapsing into “a relatively fruitless debate 
over the relationship between ‘reasonableness’ and ‘truth’.”54 I cannot agree. 
The discussion about cognitivistic aspects of the principles of justice is far from 
fruitless because it concerns a proper way of doing political philosophy under 
the condition of pluralism. Both Habermas and Rawls want to remain faithful to 
the Kantian notion of practical philosophy, but they differ in how to realize it. 
Habermas wants us to put the pluralism of worldviews through formal 
procedures of discourse in order to arrive at the jointly worked out we-
perspective. Rawls leaves, within bounds of the reasonable, the pluralism as it is 
and seeks the common perspective elsewhere.  
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